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Capitalism and Dem
Capitalism
Democracy
Barry Schwartz
peasants living throughout the third
capitalworld.
world . So the relation between capital
ism and democracy should not be
taken for granted.
Democracy and Capitalism by Samuel
Revolution by the
The Capitalist Kevolution
Bowles and Herbert Gintis. Basic
and Democracy
sociologist
Peter
Berger
Books, 1986, 244 pp.
and Capitalism by economists Samuel
Bowles and Herbert Gintis are both
I
attempts to analyze the relation between
democracy. Although
capitalism and democracy.
between
relation
hat is the
both books are concerned with the same
capitalism and democracy?
issues and presumably are examining
As questions go, this one
the same social, economic, and political
Capitalism
maya seem
like a nonstarter. Capitalism
nonstarter.
may seem like
phenomena,
phenomena, they come to radically
ecojust is democracy, applied to the eco
different conclusions
conclusions.. Berger concludes
nomic sphere of life rather than the
that
a
capitalist
economy is necessary
be
political. We hold this truth to
political
democracy, and that
a
for
does.
self-evident.
Milton
Friedman
does.
.
self-evident
capitalism plays a crucial causal role in
Ronald Reagan does. And so do all of
fostering and preserving democratic
Ronald Reagan’s
Reagan's political opponents
political institutions. Bowles and Gintis
who are even remotely electable to
conclude that capitalism and democracy
public office. We say, "It's
“It’s a free
are in conflict, and that the price for
country”
country" to justify our decisions about
preserving capitalism as we know it
voting. We also say it to justify what we
may well be extracted in the currency
wear, what we eat, where we live, what
difof
democratic participation.
participation. These dif
work we do, what stocks we buy, who
ferent
conclusions
are
partly
the
result
Democracy,
to.
sell
we buy from and
Democracy,
of powerful effects of distortions that
to most of us, means freedom of choice,
occur when a dynamic historical process
and no institution better embodies our
is frozen into a pristine but static
capitalist
the
freedom of choice than
image. A stopped watch tells the right
our
contrast
we
When
.
marketplace
marketplace.
our
time twice a day.
day. If you check the
society with those of Eastern Europe
the right moment, it
at
watch
just
color
and the Soviet Union, it is the color•
seems to be working fine. Berger caught
lessness of their clothes, cars, and
the old watch at just the right moment,
food, as much as their politics, that we
then looked away. Bowles and Gintis
appalling.
find so appalling.
passed.
kept looking when the moment passed.
Like so many of the things we think
we’re
we're sure of, this apparent relation
II
between capitalism and democracy is
not what it seems. It is certainly logically
Berger argues that ordinary, prosaic
possible to have one without the other.
transformat ive
capitalism
has been transformative
On the one hand, democratic socialism
and
revolutionary.
Even
understood
ry.
revolutiona
an
many
of
remains the utopian dream
narrowly, as an economic system in
authoritarian
intellectual. On the other, authoritarian
which enterprising individuals or groups
or totalitarian capitalism has been the
produce for a market with the purpose
of
very real nightmare of millions
of making a profit, capitalism has played
the decisive role in transforming
transforming modes
psyBarry Schwartz is a professor of psy
prop•
of production, notions of private prop
chology at Swarthmore College.
College. His
and
erty,
individual
preferences
and
most
hook, The Battle for Human
most recent book,
the
that
motives.
It
is
to
capitalism
conflict
the
Nature (Norton), examines
"
self-interest
“rational
calculation
of
self-interest”
"rational
between the language of science and the
owes
its
current
exalted
status
as
the
g
understandin
in
language of morality understanding
most central and most natural of all
human nature.
nature.
Revolution by Peter
The Capitalist Kevolution
Berger.
Berger. Basic Books, 1986, 262 pp.
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human activities.
act1v1t1es. Understood more
broadly, as a culture within which an
economic system is embedded, the
significance of capitalism is still more
profound: It has exerted its influence
profound:
on our social, political, and cultural
life.
life, as well as on our economic life.
The Capitalist Revolution offers a
relapropositions about the rela
set of fifty propositions
tion between prosperity, equality, and
liberty, along with a discussion of the
empirical evidence that supports the
propositions.
propositions. The bottom line of the
book is that most of what we find good
about modern American society owes
itself in no small measure to capitalism,
while much of what we find unfortunate
is not peculiar to capitalism and may
even be to some extent ameliorated by
it. This book, in a word, constitutes
“two and a half cheers
something like "two
capitalism."
for capitalism.”

T
T

he first cheer for capitalism
comes from an assessment of
its contribution
contributio n to material life.
here is simple
proposition
here isand,
simple and,
proposition
Berger'sBerger’s
"Industrial
I think, incontrovertible:
incontrovertible: “Industrial
capitalism has generated the greatest
history. To
productive power in human history.
ic system
date, no other socioeconom
socioeconomic
has been able to generate comparable
beginproductive power.”
power." Although its begin
considerable human
nings extracted considerable
costs—probably
costs-prob ably material and certainly
cultural—it has ended up generating
cultural-it
the highest standard of living for the
masses of people in human history.
And it is capitalism itself, not the
peculiar agglomerati
agglomeration
on of religious and
characterized
cultural elements that characterized
Western Europe when capitalism began,
matethat is responsible for this great mate
rial success. Production for profitable
market exchange provides the best
techpossible conditions for ongoing tech
innological development,
development, continued in
sustained
creases in efficiency, and sustainea
productivity. This proposition
growth in productivity.
is confirmed by the developmen
developmentt of
industrial capitalism in East Asia over
the last century. Although they had
none of the cultural baggage of the

West, Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South
Korea, and Singapore have
hav~ essentially
duplicated, at least materially, the
effiWestern capitalist experience. So effi
ciency, productivity, and affluence make
for one ringing cheer for capitalism.
The second cheer for capitalism
comes from Berger
Berger'ss assessment of the
democrelation between capitalism and democ
as"“ a politi
politiracy. He defines democracy as
cal system in which governments are
constituted by majority votes in regular
elections," and he argues
and uncoerced elections,”
can't have a democracy
that people can’t
without capitalism, that is, that capital
capital/or democracy. The
ism is necessary for
empiriargument is partly one of brute empiri
cism; if you count up socialist and
1"todern
capitalist democracies in the ftiodern
world, it turns out that capitalism is
pitching a shutout (leaving aside a few
cases). But it isn’t
isn't
possible ambiguous cases).
just a matter of counting. Berger also
relaoffers suggestions about why this rela
tion between capitalism and democracy
hold .
might hold.
Democracy represents an attempt to
limit state power, by making the state
and its bureaucracy dependent upon
people. The
and accountable to the people.
more aspects of life the state controls,
the more difficult it becomes to limit
power. Capitalism and the market
state power.
provide an institutional roadblock to
the expansion of state power. No matter
how regulated the economy may be, as
long as it is not owned by the state, what
the state can do is limited. The truth
of this claim can be seen by the contrast
with socialism, in which empirically at
"command economy”
economy" carries
least the “command
along with it an immense expansion of
state power and control. While it is
true that developed capitalism has seen
extrathe corporation grow to such extra
ordinary size that its span of control
and layers of bureaucracy are massive,
there are many such corporations, not
one, and their interests are not perfectly
aligned, either with each other or with
the state. As a result, they keep the
power of the state within bounds and
"the people”
people" to govern.
govern.
allow “the
The fundamental idea behind this
argument is of great importance. It is
govbracing to think of democracy as gov
"of the people, by the people,
ernment “of
people." But the sad fact is
and for the people.”
"the people”
people" as individuals are
that “the
strucpowerless before the institutional struc
ture of the state.
state. Nowadays, even Don
Quixote might get discouraged. Much

more effective is political action that is
institumediated by nongovernmental institu
tions that have and sustain a life of
their own. Families, tribes, villages,
labor unions, chambers of commerce,
religious groups, universities, and the
struclike provide the needed mediating struc
tures or mediating institutions between
individuals and the state.
state. Berger has
done seminal work on the character
instituand importance of mediating institu
tions in the past (to wit.
wit, To Empower
People: The Role of Mediating Structures
People:
in Public Policy with Richard Neuhaus,
1977).
1977). His suggestion in the present
book is that the market and the firms
that participate in it are essential
mediating institutions. Indeed, in the
modern world, the market and the
mediatfirm may be the most powerful mediat
have. Hence Berger’s
Berger's
ing institutions we have.
claim that capitalism is necessary for
cheer.
democracy, his second rousing cheer.
The final cheer for capitalism comes
from an assessment of its effect on
social and cultural life and institutions.
institutions.
This cheer is not unequivocal. Berger’s
Berger's
discussion focuses on social mobility
and stratification on the one hand and
individualism on the other. The record
on social mobility is a good one for
capitalism. Berger tells us that no known
society exists or has existed that has
not ranked its members in some way.
Furthermore, rank has always conferred
privilege or power. The critical question
one might ask about systems for rank
ranking people concerns how rigid and
all-encompassing the rankings are.
are.
According to Berger, under capitalism
there has been an unprecedented po
pomobility-for move
movetential for social mobility—for
ment between ranks. Berger carefully
points out that increased social mobility
mobility
industriis characteristic of all forms of industri
Neveralization, not just capitalism. Never
theless, capitalism is first among equals,
"most
“most likely to maintain openness in
society."
the stratification system of a society.”
This brings us to the down side of
capitalism and culture, its relation to
individualism, or what Berger calls
"individual autonomy.”
autonomy." The United
“individual
States is the pinnacle of individualist
proculture. Our individual autonomy, pro
tected by a host of legal and political
institutions, extends to almost all do
doinstitutions,
mains of life. As Berger points out,
whether individualism is a good thing
is itself controversial. “Today
"Today the pro
proponents of capitalism almost always
refer to its alleged linkage with indi
indi-

.. . precisely in the sense
vidual liberty ...
unof allowing and fostering the free un
folding of the individual person. On
the other side, critics of capitalism
routinely blame it for the alleged exex
cesses of ‘rampant
'rampant individualism,’
individualism,' for
selfishness and personal greed, and for
community." And
the disintegration of community.”
the critics are by no means all wild
wildeyed leftists.
leftists. Concern about the disdis
integration of community and social
responsibility is at least as much a cry
of the right, including the religious
left. So is individual
individualright, as it is of the left.
ism a triumph or a disaster?
Berger's answer is that individualism
Berger’s
is both. It is a triumph because it is
liberating. It frees the individual from
having to walk the narrow, rutted path
of his or her ancestors.
ancestors. It opens the
innovation-social, cultural,
cultural,
way for innovation—social,
and technological. It is destructive of
tradition, but not mindlessly so. It
destroys the old by creating something
new to replace it. But individualism
can go too far. There is no guarantee
inthat the mediating structures and in
stitutions that are so important to the
preservation of democracy will continue
to sustain themselves if no one takes
the time and trouble to look after
them. And individualism seems to make
them.
people less and less inclined to take
the time and trouble. In part, the
problem is that each of us decides to
let someone else do the communal
work while we continue to derive the
personal benefits.
benefits. But the problem is
also that as individuals exercise their
freedom in ever more diverse ways,
they find themselves less and less able
group.
to fit into any existing communal group.

II

t is possible to pin some of the
responsibility for individualism on
modernity in general rather than
on capitalism
in particular,
and Berger
on capitalism
in particular,
and Berger
tries to do this. Yet capitalism seems to
bear a special, intimate relation to
sociindividualism. As pointed out by soci
ologist Georg Simmel, the money
"frees the individual from
economy “frees
allegiances."
the bondage of concrete allegiances.”
Capitalism allows individuals to pur
purstatus,
chase not just commodities, but status,
llnd social position.
position. “Money,
"Money,
power, and
with its great power of abstraction,
makes it possible to convert all socially
. . into units of
relevant phenomena ....
specific monetary worth.”
worth ." There can
be no more fluid ticket of admission to
money,
one or another social group than money.
REVIEW
R
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so that the more money allows one to
agent,
buy, the more one can be a free agent,
with only short-term allegiance, at best,
to particular social institutions. If all
convertones-are convert
assets-even social ones—are
assets—even
ible into cash, people can flit from
group to group without leaving anything
of value behind.
What may be a decisive test of the
corrorelation between capitalism and corro
unsive individualism is now slowly un
folding . It concerns the phenomenon
folding.
of East Asian capitalism, especially in
West's
Japan. Japan has less of the West’s
Japan.
baggeneral individualist ideological bag
gage, and even its capitalism has been
remarkably collectivist. Can it avoid
"The
individualism? Berger thinks not. “The
societies of East Asia have succeeded
for a considerable time in modernizing
under capitalist conditions without
undergoing individuation along Western
indilines. [However,] the values of indi
vidual autonomy are undermining East
Asian communalism and are likely to
so."
continue doing so.”
Berger's account, we now face a
By Berger’s
capitalism-nourished individualism that
comthreatens to destroy our sense of com
munity. Relations between people are
becoming increasingly contractual, and
"spells our rights and
the contract “spells
obligations in a precise and exclusive
dismanner. This stands out in sharp dis
manner.
tinction from the imprecise, diffuse
networks of rights and obligations that
characterize most if not all pre-modern
societies. The capitalist market, of
course, could not exist without a mature
development of contract law. But there
is a carry-over from the market to all
relations." This contracother human relations.”
tualism, breeding as it does a cold,
calculating, purely instrumental view
of other people, does not bode well for
the family, the church, local clubs and
groups, and other mediating institutions
life. And as
that give some warmth to life.
we have seen, threats to these mediating
democinstitutions are also threats to democ
racy. Indeed, in the long run, they are
racy.
himeven threats to capitalism. Berger him
"Progressive
way: “Progressive
self puts it this way;
'on
anarchy, with each individual out ‘on
undermake' by and for himself, under
the make’
mines capitalism, because it deprives it
of the fabric of trust and value without
effectively."
which it cannot function effectively.”
Berger is exactly right here, but he
underestimates how much the negative
inexeffect of capitalism is slowly but inex
orably undermining the positive ones.
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Somehow, he fails to see that capitalism
is now a stopped watch, and that two
and a half cheers are just not enough.
Berger's vision may
The failure of Berger’s
derive from his seriously misplaced
confidence in the ability of the firm
and the market to replace the mediating
individualinstitutions which capitalist individual
ism destroys. To serve the end of
promoting democratic participation,
do. This
not just any institution will do.
point is clearly made by Harry Boyte
and Sara Evans in their discussion of
associathe importance of voluntary associa
tions as sources of democratic change
(see their articles in Ttkkun,
Tikkun, Vol. I,
No. 1, and Vol. II, No. 3, and the book
No.
Free Spaces, Harper & Row, 1986). The
critical features of such institutions
are their rootedness in the community,
their independent, voluntary nature,
char"their public or quasi-public char
and “their
acter as participatory environments
which nurture values associated with
citizenship and a broader vision of the
doesn't take a cynic
good." It doesn’t
common good.”
to understand that the firm and the
market are the last places to look for a
vision of and concern for the common
don't
good. Individuals in the market don’t
care a whit for the common good, nor
to. The whole point
"supposed" to.
are they “supposed”
of the market is that it allegedly makes
unnecesconcern for the common good unneces
sary. As economist Charles Schultze
" market-like arrangements reduce
put it, “market-like
the need for compassion, patriotism,
solidarity."
brotherly love, and cultural solidarity.”
And leaving aside so noble an idea as
individthe common good, nowadays, individ
don't even care about the welfare
uals don’t
of the firm that employs them. They
will, and do, sell the long-term interests
of their company down the river in
exchange for short-term benefits to
themselves. How does this behavior
promote true democratic participation?
In voluntary associations of the sort
that really do promote democracy, the
whole is greater than the sum of its
parts. As Boyte and Evans see it, "The
“The
demostrength of such groups, from a demo
cratic perspective, is that they have an
difindependent existence and reality dif
ferent from personal relations on the
one hand, or large and impersonal
relations on the other. The stuff of
'politics' involves conflict,
authentic ‘politics’
Indeed,ititisis
debate . ...Indeed,
argument and debate__
often through a clash of opinion in the
overcontext of certain shared and over
arching aims, that a generalized and

authentically democratic appreciation
emerges." The
of the common good emerges.”
Black churches of the American South
and the Catholic based communities
throughout Latin America have served
instituperfectly the role of mediating institu
tions by providing spaces for open
discourse and by being responsive to
local concerns. In contrast, the official
Catholic church hierarchy, closed to
debate except among the elite, has not
played this role and has become so
large and impersonal that it has lost
members.
touch with the concerns of its members.
By regarding the market and the
firm as potential mediating institutions,
Berger implicitly takes the view that
mediating institutions in general are
really nothing but interest groups,
single-issue lobbies out for themselves
good.
without concern for the common good.
narrow,
In other words, he makes the narrow,
self-interested, profit-seeking character
of the firm the model for all social
institutions, in practice if not in theory.
While it is true that interest groups
restrain the power of government, they
comdo so by introducing conflict and com
petition for pieces of the economic pie
controlled by government. Not every
such interest group can get everything
it wants, but the lesson of the market is
that no self-respecting interest group
should ever stop angling for all it can
get. Self-restraint is a game for suckers.
get.
The result is that government is pulled
incompatsimultaneously in dozens of incompat
directions ; interest-group politics
ible directions;
substitutes government ineffectuality
medifor government autocracy. With medi
ating institutions like these, we are all
Robinson Crusoes.

·•

III
Ill

Economists Samuel Bowles and
Herbert Gintis see what Peter Berger
does not. Their book Democracy and
Capitalism is a persuasive argument
democthat the actual relation between democ
racy and capitalism is one of constant
comtension and conflict rather than com
patibility and support. This conflict is
sevopaque to most observers because sev
eral centuries of social and political
viewphilosophy have seduced us into view
ing the world through lenses that make
see.
the obvious almost impossible to see.
And yet, the conflict grows so acute
that the future may require us to choose
between democracy and capitalism.

mericans have grown up steeped
in a liberal individualism
individualism that
pubdistinguishes
distinguishes between the pub
life. The
lic and
tbe spheres
private of
spheres
of life.
private
lic and the
focus of the public sphere is the state,
state,
and the matters of political power, right,
and responsibility
Essen
responsibility that go with it. EssenImtially, everythin
everything
g else is private. Im
portantly,, within the liberal tradition,
portantly
democratic
do
principles only apply in doic principles
democrat
mains that are public. That is, rational
mains
doadults elect state leaders. In other do
mains
mains of life, like the family, the church,
or the workplace—domains
workpla ce-doma ins that are
democracy are
private—principles
private- principl es of democracy
irrelevant.
irrelevant. Thus, there is no conflict
becy be
between capitalism and democra
democracy
cause their principle
principless apply in different
In· effect,
and nonoverlapping
nonoverlapping domains. In'effect,
dem
conflicts between capitalism and demd by definition
ocracy are eliminate
eliminated
definition..
don't rule out conflicts by
If you don’t
definition,
Considerr
them . Conside
n, you get them.
definitio
property. Private property is the sine
capitalism. People have the
qua non of capitalism.
right, within broad limits, to do what
they want with their property. So why
is it that I am not allowed to exclude
you're
you from my restaurant
restaurant because you’re
Black, or a woman? Why can't
can’t I refuse
to hire you, or refuse to pay you as
as
much as I pay others doing similar
work, because of your race, sex, or
or
religion? The answer is that much, if
not all, private property has a public
aspect. Society decides to what extent
principles
democracy should apply
principles of democracy
to the domain of private property.
movement in
Much of the civil rights movement
women's
this country, as well as the women’s
movement,
t, can be seen in fact as a
movemen
struggle to extend principles
democ
principles of democracy from the domain of the state to
property.
the domain of private property.
diInstead of liberalism
liberalism’s
's artificial di
chotomy of public and private, Bowles
and Gintis offer a vision of social life
and
-the economic
spheres—the
economic,,
as divided into spheres
the political, the cultural. The novelty
is that each sphere of life has its own
economic,, political, and cultural asas
economic
pects. Seen in this light, all spheres of
life become contested terrain, battles
cy and
between principles
democracy
principles of democra
principles
ownership. While this has
principles of ownership.
eous
always existed, due to the simultan
simultaneous
expansion
n both of rights and of markets,
expansio
democracy and
the conflict between democracy
ownership
especially acute
ownership has grown especially
during the last few decades. The lanlan
increasdemocracy has increas
guage of liberal democracy
ingly
invaded the firm, the school, and
ingly invad~d

A
A

even
even the family, slowly changing the
norms of appropriate
appropriate conduct in these
domains.
“the capicapi
.
domains At the same time, "the
talist firm’s
firm's ongoing search for profits
The
progressively
encroach es upon all
progressively encroaches
spheres of social activity, leaving few
imperarealms of life untouched
untouched by the impera
market."
tives of accumulation
accumulation and the market.”
That liberalism has effectively
effectively walled
tic rights
democratic
considerations of democra
off considerations
ip and
from consider
considerations
ownership
ations of ownersh
that the wall is now crumbling
crumbling is the
heart
heart of the Bowles and Gintis book.
sts
They discuss at length how economi
economists
and
and social theorists from both the left
and the right have lacked this insight
osed the
misdiagnosed
and, as a result, have misdiagn
problems society faces and have mispreeconscribed solutions.
Neoclassical econ
solutions. Neoclassical
ecotraditionally viewed eco
omists have traditionally
nomics
nomics as divorced from politics and
questions
questions of power. The myth of the
imperanonymous, imper
market is that it is anonymous,
apolitical.. You sell to anyone
sonal, and apolitical
for the right price and you buy from
for
anyone for the right price. People who
g segmisuse the market by excludin
excluding
seg
ments of the populati
population
on from the
workforce
workforce or the customer pool or by
nts for
withholding
investments
withholding sound investme
nonbusiness
ess reasons will be driven out
nonbusin
of business by competitors
competitors who will
hire anyone qualified,
qualified, sell to anyone
who can pay, and invest in anything
"power"
that seems profitable.
profitable. The only “power”
that is displayed in the market is the
power of economic rationality:
rationality: efficient
e, and
production,
comparative
advantage,
ive advantag
production, comparat
opportun ism. The language
inventive opportunism.
of rights and control has no place.
So goes the
traditional
al view of the
th~ tradition
market economy.
economy. It is false, and not
just
just because actual markets are only
approximations
com
ations of the perfectly comapproxim
economists
petitive abstractions
abstractions that economists
talk about. Bowles and Gintis show
that this view of the market is false for
competition"
"perfect competition”
deep reasons that “perfect
won’t
won't change. The heart of the problem
economists view the laboris that while economists
wage exchange between worker and
commodity
boss as they would any other commodity
exchange,, it is not. Labor cannot be
exchange
alienated from the laborer. You don't
don’t
hire work, you hire workers. And to
extract work from the worker, the boss
must be able to exert control. When
you're
you buy a stereo, you know what you’re
getting. When you "buy"
“buy” a worker,
what you get is very much up in the air.
What this means is that in addition
to the cost of the wage itself, the boss

must absorb the cost of enforcing the
wage bargain. This may mean paying
rs. It may mean
supervisors.
overseers or superviso
productivity. It
offering incentive
incentivess for productivity.
may mean being able to threaten serious
sanctions for slacking off. What is
clear, however, is that the more power
the boss has over the worker, the more
s/he will be able to get his or her
s/he
money’s
money's worth on the job.
The costs of enforcing the wage
bargain are substantial.
substantial. The way that
cost can be reduced is found in how
the
laws. The costs of
the state enforces its laws.
enforcement
enforcement go down as the perceived
legitimacy
y of the state and its laws goes
legitimac
y, most
up. In a participatory
democracy,
participatory democrac
themselves as having
citizens perceive themselves
responsibility for the rules that
some responsibility
are
promulgated
are promulgated and some stake in the
success
government. After all,
success of the government.
the
the people who pass and enforce the
laws
responsible to the
ultimately responsible
laws are ultimately
citizens
citizens who elect them and pay their
salaries. As a result, most laws are
largely self-enfo
self-enforcing.
autocraticc
rcing. In an autocrati
ent are
state, the costs of enforcem
enforcement
enormous.
perceivedd
s. Rules have no perceive
enormou
legitimacy,
legitimacy, and anyone will do whatever
s/he thinks s/he can get away with.
he lesson is clear. The capitalist
ent costs
enforcement
can reduce enforcem
operation
by making his or her operation
tory.
c and more
less autocratic
andparticipa
more participatory.
less autocrati
S/he can give workers a voice in
indecision-making,
making, make their work in
decisionteresting and fulfilling so that they can
company,
identify pridefully
pridefully with the company,
and
and perhaps even give them a financial
stake in the operation.
operation. And the evidence
workis
democratization of the work
is that democratization
place
efficiency
as
well
increase
does
place
enon. The lower en
satisfaction.
as worker satisfacti
forcement
forcement costs and higher efficiency
meantized and mean
that come with democra
democratized
st
economist
ingful work would lead an economi
democratized
to expect that, over time, democratized
out
autocratic ones out
firms would drive autocratic
existence.. If one company makes
of existence
things cheaper and better than its
competitors,
competition either
competitors, the competition
under.
changes or goes under.
This
happened. Indeed, there
hasn't happened.
T_his hasn’t
participais little evidence that worker participa
tion projects are anything but a mild
perturbation
otherwisee smooth
perturba tion on an otherwis
sea of autocracy.
aren't workerautocracy. Why aren’t
controlled
controlled firms taking over the market?
reaBowles and Gintis discuss several rea
tization
sons why workplace
democratization
workplace democra
that,
is
is not yet having the impact that.
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on grounds of economic efficiency, it
should. The one I focus on here can be
traced to the difference between hiring
work and hiring workers. Suppose you
are about to set up a plarrt
plant and establish
jobs that are engaging, require subsub
stantial training and skill, and pay
well. You hire workers and spend several
months, and many thousands of dollars,
them . In effect, you use your
training them.
capital to invest in education and train
training instead of in the plant and hightech equipment. Who now owns that
investment? Not you. If you fire the
workers that you trained, or if they
quit, they take the investment with
them. The more time you spend training
people, the greater your stake in keeping
them and the greater their leverage in
situations of conflict. While your firm
effi
may become more productive and efficient than the competition, you will
not be in a position to insure that you,
and not your workers, will enjoy the
proceeds of that increased productivity.
Furthermore, it is always possible that
your skilled workers will blackmail you
into paying them wages that are so high
that any potential efficiency advantage
is lost. Because you don't
don’t own workers
and thus can't
can’t completely control their
behavior, it seems prudent to invest in
machines and keep jobs as menial as
possible.
The "deskilling"
“deskilling” phenomenon occuroccur
ring within the American labor force
has become an issue of widespread concon
cern as America becomes increasingly
a third-world-style economic nation,
exporting raw materials and importing
manufactured goods. It's
It’s a phenomenon
that no one wants but about which
nothing can be done as long as the
liberal split is maintained between the
public and the private, with matters of
property firmly located in the private
domain. Understandably, Bowles and
Gintis would bring at least some aspects
of property into the public domain.
They argue that any exercise of power
that has significant social consequences
should be seen as public, whether that
power is exercised by the state, by the
economy, or even by the church or the
household. And if it is seen as public,
then principles of democratic decision
making apply. There is no question that
economic developments have significant
social consequences. What follows from
this is that the behavior of private
firms should be the product of public
decision making.
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features of the human character on
canwhich liberal democracy depends can
In the portrait of human nature
not be taken for granted. On the
painted by liberalism, people are
contrary, the political and economic
"“choosers,”
choosers," acting in private (the
system extolled by Berger actively
(the
market, the bedroom) or in public (the
erodes that character.
voting booth) to satisfy their prefer
In the modern, liberal, capitalist
preferences. What this portrait leaves out,
state, the expression of will is restricted
Bowles and Gintis tell us, is any ac
acto the choice of a preestablished slate
count of where preferences originate.
of candidates, either in the market or
Liberalism (and neoclassical economics)
in the voting booth. The alternative to
treats preferences as"
exogenous," out
outas “exogenous,”
choosing from a given selection of
side the system, given. There is no
candidates or of goods is taking an
accounting for tastes; liberalism merely
active part in the shaping of that
supplies the rules for the exercise of
selection. Such participatory activity is
free choice in satisfying whatever those
what Albert Hirschman calls “voice”
"voice "
(see his Hxit,
Exit, Voice and Loyalty). Giving
tastes are. People are what they are,
human nature is what it is, and liberal
liberalvoice in a large and complex society
ism simply sees to it that people are as
typically requires some form of group
free as possible to exercise their natures.
natures.
gemeinmembership, some form of gemeinscha/t, the "mediating
institutions"
schaft,
“mediating institutions”
owles and Gintis argue that
previously mentioned, which market
the notion of exogenous prefer
prefercapitalism destroys. It is a great irony
ences just won't
do. “Liberalism
"Liberalism
instituwon’t do.
that those for whom mediating institu
claims that
marketplace
and theand the
claimsthethat
the marketplace
tions like the family, the church, and
ballot box allow people to get what
the small-town community are most
they want. But liberalism is silent on
important are capitalism's
capitalism’s most ardent
how people might get to be what they
defenders.
defenders.
want to be, and how they might get to
The mistake made by those who,
want what they want to want.”
want." Prefer
Preferlike Berger, defend capitalism in part
ences come from somewhere; tastes
by crediting it with extending social
are formed by something. People are
interaction across previously impreg
impregwhat they are in part as a result of the
mobilnable barriers, increasing social mobil
conditions they encounter in their lives.
lives .
ity, and destroying autocratic, parochial
The critical insight here is that econ
econdomination, is their failure to appreciate
domination,
omies do not just make things; they
that the effects of their capitalism are
also make people. The cauldron of
dynamic. Capitalism grinds away at
liberalism and capitalism permits not
social structures that are rigid, unjust,
and oppressive, but when it gets to
just the exercise but the formation of
the will.
social structures that are flexible, fair,
The reason this is so important is
doesn't stop grinding,
and liberating, it doesn’t
that the character of both an economy
it just keeps on going and presumably
and a state will depend in part upon
will continue until social structures
the character of its participants. An
are simply
simp_ll gone. By photographing
economy that encourages the pursuit
capitalism at one moment in its history,
of self-interest as a matter of right or
and staring at the photograph, one
even of obligation is prevented from
capitalmisses the important point that capital
becoming a bazaar of deceitful, backism is not a still life, it’s
it's a movie.
movie.
stabbing monsters only by the moral
The reason that the social decay we
commitments that people bring with
are experiencing has not been more
them to the marketplace. A democracy
noticeable to us is that markets reduce
that offers individuals little opportunity
particithe costs to individuals of not partici
for genuine participation is prevented
pating actively in politics. As long as
from becoming a collection of automa
automawe have the cash, we can buy the ends
we desire as individuals instead of camtons marching periodically to the polls
cam
for"“ communito record their affection for
communi
paigning, organizing, and arguing for
cators"
cators” only by the commitment people
them as groups. We can spend money
on private schools and safe neighbor
neighborhave to behaving as responsible citizens.
If we could count on moral commitment
hoods . It is this very lack of the need
hoods.
and political responsibility, democracy
coordinafor group organization and coordina
and capitalism might coexist in the
tion that champions of the market
applaud. And as public commitment
way that Berger suggests. But the very
applaud.
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and cultural solidarity grow weaker,
market solutions to social problems
Eventually, politics
look more sensible. Eventually,
itself enters the market, with politicians
cam“selling”
"selling" programs for votes or cam
paign contributions.
contributions. This leads to a
n of the democrati
dramatic diminutio
diminution
democraticc
voice. Once we start buying votes,
politicians become property, and the
norms of ownership wrest control of
democratic
the state from the norms of democratic
participation.
participation.
The consequence
consequence of equating norms
of government
government activity with norms of
market activity is that in the market,
outaction is indicated only when the out
n is
it calculatio
come of a cost-benef
cost-benefit
calculation
instrumental; it
positive.
positive. All action is instrumental;
w:e carry
is done to get something.
something . If we
this instrumental
instrumental view of action into
politics, there is virtually never a good
reason to act. There is really nothing
you can do as an individual to influence
polipolitical life except for buying poli
ticians. And what you can do as a
member of a group can be done just
as effectively by the group without
you. As a result, the rational, economic
stance to political activity is to be a
“free-rider.”." It doesn't
doesn’t even make much
"free-rider
sense to vote, let alone to organize,
campaign,
letter-write, or picket. Why,
campaign , letter-write,
then, does political activity still occur?
The answer is that people do not yet
instruregard their activity as merely instru
partimental. Group membership
membership and parti
expressive ; they are
cipation are also expressive;
part of what defines people. People
self-images as
vote because of their self-images
citizens.
People
picket
because it is
citizens.
consistent with their moral vision of
democratic
themselves.
themselves. At the heart of democratic
action is
participation
the
idea
that
is
ion
participat
end.
not just a means to an end.
But this idea is not engraved on the
human character.
character. As the ethos of the
market and economic rationality govern
likelimore and more of our lives, the likeli
hood of participation
participat ion will diminish,
as indeed it already has. Once this
happens, the various local groupsgroups—
mediating institutions—that
institutio ns-that occupy the
vast space between the individual and
disintegrate. Thomas
the state start to disintegrate.
democJefferson thought that a healthy democ
republics,"
"small republics,”
racy required these “small
that they would be “the
"the main strength of
the great one."
one.” Bowles and Gintis add,
communities
“In
"In the absence of vital communities
standing between the individual and
the state, liberalism’s
liberalism's cherished political
principle, liberty, is experienced
experienced more

range of permissible
participat ion by
permissible participation
workers in the workplace,
workplace, by children
in the school, by women and children
in the family, we will foster the kind of
human nature that will make for active
participation
state. Neither the
participat ion in the state.
corporation
corporation nor the state will be allowed
autocratic.
to become autocratic.
There is nothing especially revolurevolu
tionary in this proposal. As Bowles and
busiGintis point out, it is in many ways busi
ness as usual. Determining
Determining the scope
of application
application of a set of principles is
what social life is all about.
about. The market
is the place for exchanges of private
ur society is fast becoming
conproperty.
property. But there are plenty of con
(proptyrannical, with money (prop
,
exchanged
straints
on
what
can
be
exchanged,
good.
erty) as the dominant good.
can't
.
under
what
conditions.
People
can’t
conditions
housing,
position,
Money
buys
social
position,
housing,
social
Money buys
themselves into slavery, nor can
sell themselves
education,
education, health care, good looks,
they
sell their children. Car salesmen
and political power. When we see this
can’t
can't sell unsafe cars at a discount.
in its extreme form, we recoil. Walzer
Doctors and lawyers can't
can’t give bad
Pullman,
describes the example of Pullman,
service
at
bargain
prices.
Workers can
Illinois, a company town literally owned
be
fired
from
their
jobs,
but
they can't
can’t
Pull—lock,
stock,
and
barrel—by
the
Pull
barrel-by
-lock,
be beaten or imprisoned.
imprisoned. What Bowles
man Company. Mr. Pullman assumed
differand Gintis are urging is that the differ
that property rights applied in his
as
life
ent
social
we
know
of
spheres
So
town, just as they did in his factory.
them be preserved,
preserved, but that principles
just as he told its residents, all company
of democracy
participat ion nudge
democracy and participation
employees,
employees, what to do in his factory,
and ownership
principles
of
hierarchy
he also told them how to live in his
wherever possible.
town. They weren’t
weren't required to live
How does this extension of principles
benevothere, and he was a reasonably benevo
of
democracy
mediat
democracy work to preserve mediatlent fellow, but, nevertheless,
nevertheless, it seemed
participaing institutions
institutions and broader participa
and was later judged in court to be
people's attitudes
tion? First, since people’s
town.
"own" aa town.
wrong for anyone to “own.”
willingness
toward
their
work
and
their willingness
The town we all live in is becoming
to
do
it
with
care
and
energy
depend
Pullman.
to
increasingly
increasingly similar
on how work is organized
organized,, how rewards
are distributed,
distribute d, and how authority is
V
distributed,, and how people are treated
distributed
supervisors,
by their colleagues and supervisors,
How then do we go about preserving
particiresponsible, partici
being treated as a responsible,
and protecting democracy
democracy from its
pating
agent
on
the
job
can
be
expected
capitalism? Must
corrosive contact with capitalism?
charto contribute to the formation of char
destructio n
we engage in the wholesale destruction
acter. Second, breaking down hierarchy,
of the state and the market as we know
either in access to decisions or in
not.
them? Bowles and Gintis think not.
access to goods, is a way of strengthen
strengthenWhat is required is not one big struggle,
notes,
communal ties. As Walzer notes,
ing communal
but lots of small ones. Personal rights
be“communal
al provision is important be
"commun
are to be preserved;
preserved; they are not the
memcause it teaches us the value of mem
mere bourgeois ideology perceived by
bership. If we did not provide for one
Marxism.
Marxism . Property rights in some form
distinctions
another, if we recognized no distinctions
are also to be preserved.
preserved . For many
strangers,
between
members
and
we
years the mutual existence of personal
would have no reason to form and
harmonious
and property rights seemed harmonious
communities."
maintain political communities.”
—even synergistic
synergistic,, as long as their
-even
daIn
the
run,
the recommen
recommenda
short
application were
discrete domains of application
tions
of
Bowles
and
Gintis
can
be
preserved.
But
pressure
to
enlarge
the
preserved.
effective. The extension of personal
sphere of personal rights has created
institurights can invigorate mediating institu
conconflicts. The way to resolve the con
democracy or at
tions and strengthen democracy
flicts, according to Bowles and Gintis,
least protect it from being further
is to increase the scope of personal
weakened by corrosive market capitalrights still further. If we increase the

freedom."
as loneliness than as freedom.”
In Spheres of Justice,
Justice , Michael Walzer
argues that different principles of justice
apply within different spheres of life.
inSerious problems of injustice and in
equity arise when the differentiation
differentiation of
spheres starts to break down, and
success in one sphere is necessary for
success in all the others. In such a
dominant,
situation, one good becomes dominant,
and the people who control it control
everything.
everything. Pascal described such a
tyranny.
situation as tyranny.
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ism. But in the long run, the emphasis
on personal rights feeds directly into
the liberal individualism that Bowles
and Gintis see as the philosophical
difficulties .
core of our current social difficulties.
In viewing the strategy of redressing
the imbalance of rights as a general
solution to the problem of conflict
between democracy and capitalism,
th~
Bowles and Gintis are guilty of th?
same kind of shortsightedness as Berger.
If we imagine the sort of extension of
personal rights they propose and look
a few years into the future, what we
will see is a collection of individuals,
all guarding their personal rights as
they deal with the market and the state.
vanMediating institutions will have van
ished. They will have vanished because
while they play a critical role in helping
to protect personal rights, the pursuit
of personal rights does nothing in itself
to protect them. What is missing is a
notion of obligation or responsibility
to the group that counterbalances or
restrains the pursuit of personal rights.

In the short term, while individuals are
grateful to their local institutions for
helping them win difficult battles for
autonomy and respect, the individuals
will stay loyal to the institutions. But
in the long term, as autonomy becomes
commonplace, the importance of the
forgotten. So as the
institutions will be forgotten.
dynamic process of securing personal
berights proceeds, the solution will be
come part of the problem.
Emphasis on individual rights has
its times and places. It was critical in
Western Europe and the colonies when
people were trying to break the rigid
social bonds of feudalism. But for us,
those times are now past, and the appeal
to individual rights must be balanced
by an appeal to communal obligation
responsibility. Progressives have
and responsibility.
typically been suspicious of such apap
peals, regarding them as veiled attempts
estabto keep power in the hands of estab
lished minority groups and out of the
hands of the masses. And it should be
unsaid that such suspicions are not un

sorely
warranted. However, what is most sorely
needed now is an appeal to communal
obligation that will keep mediating
institutions strong enough to survive.
survive.
Otherwise, isolated individuals will be
pitted against states and markets that
grow ever larger and less responsive to
human concerns. The problem we all
instituface is how to keep mediating institu
tions strong without making them
completely inflexible.
believe-and to
There is reason to believe—and
hope-that Americans who have always
hope—that
regarded themselves as progressive now
understand how important it is to
preserve the mediating institutions that
have played a formative role in their
tradition,
own lives. People to whom tradition,
and especially traditional institutions,
were always anathema have come to
see how empty it is to try and go it
alone, and how difficult it is to create
institutions" whenever a need
"instant institutions”
“instant
for organized action arises. D
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I do not mean to give a backhanded
accompliment to Rosenak for his ac
complishment. This book would be a
major work no matter what the library
of Jewish education looked like. The
monuquestiop
questiqp the book addresses is monu
mental: How has modernity changed
the nature of the way we must pass on
the Jewish tradition to future generagenera
convinctions? Rosenak shows quite convinc
ingly 'that
that for all but the most insulated
Orthodox communities there is no
escaping the effects of modernity on
the task of education. The various
coping strategies by which some people
retreat into the fantasy of an intact
premodern world (even though it no
longer exists) and others bend tradition ·
to the whim of a false "relevance"
“relevance” all
at.
fail to address the central problem at
the
core—we live in the world of
ilie core-we
modernity and that fact lies at the
dilemma.
heart of our educational dilemma.
Rosenak believes that exploring this

